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Literature Review 
 The sources utilized in this thesis each serve a particular function in relation to the 
theoretical framework. They are organized by the extent to which they contribute to the three 
dominant disciplinary approaches found throughout the work. The established literature referenced 
in the first section contributes to the historical summary of the Supreme Court’s forward 
progression toward the public disclosure of its work. Many sources used therein are primary, as 
they are meant to portray contemporary accounts of the Court’s steps as they occur in time. 
 The sources used in the second section help to develop transparency as a demanded 
intangibility—a commodity of sorts. Hopefully, understanding transparency as a resource for the 
public will allow for the reader of this thesis to make sense of the concept’s variable application 
in all parts of the federal government. 
 In the third section, the sources used are distinct in that they are meant to help conceptualize 
the potential consequences of implementing cameras in the Supreme Court. Identifying the 
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public’s stance on issues related to the Supreme Court itself is necessary to any speculation 
regarding the consequences. This is because they affect the public both directly and indirectly. In 
this final section, much of the literature also includes pre-fabricated ideas about what could 
potentially happen if the institution were to tolerate televised coverage of proceedings. In my own 
assessment, I am skeptical of the reasoning in positions for both the affirmative and the negative, 
but I ultimately side with those—and with others in part—whom I feel better represent my ideas 
regarding the Court’s future. This summary view is expressed in the second subsection of Chapter 
III and elaborated in the conclusion of this thesis. 
Thesis Statement 
 In our democracy (a constitutional republic) the value of transparency cannot be overstated, 
as it provides a monitorial means through which the electorate can ensure their interests are 
maintained by those who make decisions on their behalf. Nonetheless, whether the obligation of 
transparency should be taken to apply throughout the government co-equally—and specifically, in 
the nation’s highest court—has become subject to disagreement. Though the benefits of increasing 
transparency in the U.S. Supreme Court are indeed significant, doing so by permitting video 
cameras for court proceedings in an era of considerable ideological polarization may also yield 
unwanted consequences that should discourage efforts toward any implementation policy at this 
point in time. 
Theoretical Framework 
 To properly assess and respond to the debate regarding cameras in the Court, this work 
begins with a historical discussion, covering a near-comprehensive timeline of the institution’s 
progression in public disclosure. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the extent to which the 
Court has already become the most transparent branch of the federal government. This thesis then 
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proceeds to evaluate the potential outcomes of camera implementation while making sense of the 
societal context in which the debate persists. The idea of government transparency is a theme 
discussed throughout the work, as it is the fundamental demand that underlies the relevant debate.  
Project Description 
 This thesis endeavors to address the debate regarding whether video cameras ought to be 
allowed in the United States Supreme Court. Prior to joining the relevant discussion, I provide a 
comprehensive history of the Court’s steps toward increased transparency, beginning with the 
institution’s inception. This section highlights the evolving role of transparency in the context of 
institutional independence—a context that persists emphatically today. The following section 
describes the role and degree of transparency in the elected branches of the federal government. It 
contrasts the obligation of disclosure in these branches with that of the Judiciary and also seeks to 
identify the propriety of selective disclosure in each of the three. 
Then, this thesis focuses on the prospect of video camera implementation. I have chosen 
to dissect the positive and negative consequences that might occur should the Court lift the current 
device ban. In the final section, I compare the consequences, then proceed to argue that the 
probable negatives cause concerns that should outweigh the potential benefits. I believe that 
camera implementation can happen without compromising the Supreme Court’s ability to function 
properly, but only if society changes. In this section, I discuss the societal polarization that makes 
a policy allowing cameras so dangerous, and I detail the developments that must take place if the 
Court is to progress safely.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Current practice in the U.S. Supreme Court maintains a tradition of prohibiting video 
cameras inside the courtroom during both argument and non-argument sessions. However, an act 
of the Legislature may effectively subject this policy to change, as it is not within the Court’s 
exclusive authority to decide. Should statutory means provide for the implementation of video 
recording during proceedings, the institution must surely comply. Of course, the Supreme Court 
may exercise review of a statute such as this in the event an objecting party—on grounds of 
provable injury—petitions the high court under its appellate jurisdiction. What then must the Court 
consider? The principal motive underlying the relevant debate is an increase in institutional 
transparency, which is part of the more encompassing discourse over transparency in the federal 
government as a whole. 
Justice Brandeis believed that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman.”1 He, like many others in our country’s history, believed that a 
democracy ought to entail a readily-informed public, equipped with the information and materials 
it needs in order to participate in government. In the elected branches, the relationship shared by 
the people and those whom they choose to make decisions on their behalf is relatively intimate. 
This connection should yield a somewhat higher obligation of governmental transparency in order 
to encourage an active relationship—something which is probably in the greater interest of the 
populace. 
                                                 
1 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Thoemmes 
Press 2003) (1914). 
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However, the sovereignty of the people is nevertheless limited, especially, some might add, 
in the federal judiciary. Their influence as to who assumes a seat on the bench is operative only at 
the ballot box. The people elect an executive as well as individuals by whom they are represented 
in the Senate; the former nominates judges to occupy the courts, and the latter provides its 
constitutionally-prescribed “Advice and Consent” thereafter.2 Therefore, the extent to which 
Americans may “assess progress” and “assign blame” is evident solely (though indirectly) in their 
civic role as the electorate.3 Governmental transparency, as it is so understood, thus does not apply 
to the Judiciary as it does to its institutional checks and balances, since the nature of the relationship 
shared between the Judiciary and the people is comparatively disconnected. Nonetheless, the 
proverbial closed-doors policy is still subject to popular censure. Proponents of general 
transparency believe a reversal in the Court’s stance is necessary, but lawmakers are evidently 
careful in their approach to satisfying such demands. This sense of caution is demonstrated in 
proposed legislative efforts that purport to show deference to the institution’s case-by-case 
discretion.4 
If even those with the authority to implement video cameras exhibit hesitance, do their 
partial concessions warrant further attention? Should we look to societal preparedness or a lack 
thereof? If so, is it incumbent upon the government to acknowledge this social state before 
                                                 
2 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
3 Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 917 (2006) (“[P]opular accountability need[s] a system for disclosing 
information about government.”). 
4 Cameras in the Courtroom Act, H.R. 464, 115th Cong. § 678 (2017) (“The Supreme Court shall 
permit television coverage of all open sessions of the Court unless the Court decides, by a vote of the 
majority of justices, that allowing such coverage in a particular case would constitute a violation of the due 
process rights of one or more of the parties before the Court.”). 
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changing the Court’s policy? This thesis argues that allowing video cameras inside the courtroom 
is not a proper remedy to the demand for increased transparency—at least not at this time. 
I am of the mind that cameras might actually have a place in the Court’s future. In fact, the 
potential benefits are so valuable that I believe we should by no means abandon the relevant debate. 
However, the negative concerns are possibly so profound that their long-term implications may be 
detrimental to the institution’s ability to operate impartially and with its intended independence. 
So, I believe that, since these negatives relate to possible political encroachment, if the Court were 
to pursue cameras, it should wait until society has reached a point where the degree of its political 
polarization is not as high as it currently is. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY 
 
Judicial Accessibility, 1789 to 1953 
Advocacy for increased disclosure in the Supreme Court is not a new phenomenon in the 
United States, and arguments for transparency easily predate the advent of camera technology. 
Some proponents of such changes have cited various concerns in hopes of making available as 
much information and material as possible, while others even claim that policies to the contrary 
merit labels such as “secretive” and “opaque.”5 Fortunately for them, the institution has continually 
built upon successive efforts toward increased disclosure either directly or in the pursuit of 
unrelated objectives that have nonetheless produced the same result. The Court’s evolution through 
history, however, has been neither a recent nor rapid development, and it has progressed with due 
care since its foundation. 
Throughout the Supreme Court’s progression toward increased transparency, the 
institution has stayed mindful of its intended independence. We should remember that the Court 
has also maintained awareness of its developing responsibility to review cases impartially—a task 
made possible by its political insulation. So, in observing the historical implementation of new 
media for transparency, we can say such steps are progressive, but we should remove ourselves 
from the common understanding of progressivism in government. Instead, Alexander Bickel’s 
exploration of the ideological spectrum among judges provides a more appropriate view of what 
it means to act progressively within an old and naturally conservative framework. He suggests that 
                                                 
5 Eric J. Segall, Invisible Justices: How Our Highest Court Hides from the American People, 32 
GA ST. U. L. REV. 787, 847 (2016). 
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a framework like this is “inhospitable to social … experimentation” and, by inference, that 
“progressiv[ism], having regard to the unrest of the people,” might otherwise seek its 
accommodation.6 
The Court’s history of information disclosure begins with the release of opinions, which 
began in 1791.7 Opinions represent the ultimate product of the institution’s work, which makes 
sense because the foremost responsibility of the judiciary is to render judgments concerning 
individual cases. Today, their dissemination is facilitated by the Reporter of Decisions, whose 
salaried office was created statutorily in 1817, providing that the said Reporter “shall print and 
publish, or cause to be printed and published, the decisions of [the Supreme Court].”8 The law 
establishes that the Reporter is to be appointed by the Court and lists the duties relevant to the 
position.9 However, the tenures of the first two reporters actually predate the law. When the 
justices first met for the first two terms in New York City, they appointed a Crier on February 2, 
1790, and a Clerk on the following day; they did not name a reporter.10 But, there was no practical 
                                                 
6 Alexander M. Bickel, Adjectival Simplicities and the Neo-Realists, Nihilists, et al., in THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 78 (1986). I reference Bickel’s 
discussion because its view of progressivism versus conservatism can be used to accurately describe the 
implementation of any new transparency policy in the Supreme Court, without playing on the ordinary 
understanding of progressivism today. The decision to release, say, oral argument transcripts—something 
that only began in the mid-twentieth century—would be considered a progressive action here because the 
release demonstrates social experimentation insofar as it caters to public demands for further disclosure of 
the inner workings of the institution. It is a response to the “unrest of the people.” The same principle 
applies to all other steps toward transparency. 
7 Prior to this, maintaining any trace of judicial records was not mandated by law. 
8 An Act to Provide for Reports of the Decisions of the Supreme Court, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 376, (1817). 
9 The act requires that opinions be printed and published within six months of their having been 
made, and the Reporter is to also deliver eighty copies to the Secretary of State. These copies are to then be 
distributed to the President of the United States, the justices of the Supreme Court, the judges of the U.S. 
District Courts, and to various other officers of the federal government. Copies of opinions are also required 
by this law to be delivered to the Library of Congress for, assumedly, archival purposes. 
10 1 Engrossed Minutes, Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, Record Group 267, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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need for one, seeing as its docket was empty for the first three terms. It was not until the Court 
prepared to issue its first opinion, in West v. Barnes (1791), that it finally required the services of 
a new officer.11 
So, in 1790, the Court named Alexander J. Dallas of Pennsylvania to assume virtually the 
same responsibilities vested to the Reporter in the session law of 1817. Dallas was born in Jamaica 
and educated in England before he settled in the U.S. in the early 1780s to practice law as a member 
of the Philadelphia bar.12 His original publication of “at least eleven accounts of cases decided in 
the Pennsylvania and Delaware courts” from 1788 to 1790 was well enough received for him to 
undertake a compilation of Pennsylvania court decisions in book form.13 Volume 1 of Dallas’ 
Reports constitutes the first volume of the United States Reports, a collection which features his 
contributions up until the end of his service with the Supreme Court in 1800. Dallas would go on 
to lead a life of both private practice and public service, “culminating in his appointment as [James] 
Madison’s Secretary of the Treasury in 1814.”14 
However, the accuracy of Dallas’ reporting is questionable. His work is indisputably the 
first comprehensive collection of American law reports of any kind—a respectable feat in and of 
itself.15 Yet, as Craig Joyce states, Dallas’ early reports are merely “accounts of Pennsylvania 
                                                 
11 West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791) (unanimously deciding that, “writs of error to remove 
causes to [the] court from inferior courts, can regularly issue only from the clerk’s office of [the] court.”). 
The only other activity by the Court in that term (August, 1791) was to rule on a procedural motion in the 
first case ever placed on the Supreme Court’s docket, Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 
(1791). 
12 R. WALTERS, JR., ALEXANDER JAMES DALLAS: LAWYER – POLITICIAN – FINANCIER 1759-1817, 
at 7, 8-9 (1943) 
13 Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall 
Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1295-1296, 1298 (1985). Volume 2 of Dallas’ Reports is where 
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court first appear. 
14 Id. at 1295. 
15 Id. at 1296; see also JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 799 (1 
Devise History, 1971). “[S]omewhat less than half of the dispositions made by the Supreme Court in the 
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decisions … based on notes preserved by judges and lawyers.”16 The fact that these initial reports 
are not written opinions, as we might otherwise assume, is somewhat concerning because we rely 
on judges alone to produce binding material. At the same time, however, there did not exist a 
pressing need for a collection of wholly accurate colonial case law, at least for referencing 
purposes. Prior to the Revolution, law practice in the colonies utilized English common law as 
precedent, but following independence, only common law decisions handed down before the 
Declaration (1776) were considered persuasive in American courts.17 In the decade following that 
year, however, no new American precedent—which was suddenly necessary—was created, and 
American courts “remained almost entirely dependent on English legal literature.”18 Needless to 
say, the circumstances of the forced transitions brought by the Revolution made the jobs of those 
like Alexander Dallas tedious and confusing. Furthermore, there was no statutory requirement that 
opinions be reduced to writing in the Pennsylvania courts, and it was not until 1806, when Dallas 
had just finished his Reports, that such a law would place this burden on judges.19 So, interestingly, 
Dallas’ work is not a complete body of primary case law. Moreover, with specific regard to the 
United States Supreme Court, Dallas still did not receive the help that he might otherwise have 
benefitted from since the justices were also not legally obligated to write down their opinions.20 
                                                 
first decade of its existence are reported,” but when the reporting scope is narrowed to cases decided on the 
merits or on jurisdictional grounds, this statistic “probably exceeds 70 percent.” Thus, Dallas’ Reports is 
not fully comprehensive. 
16 Id. The specific compilation Joyce refers to is Dallas’ 1790 publication, Reports of Cases Ruled 
and Adjudged in the Courts of Pennsylvania Before and Since the Revolution. The volume contains law 
reports dating as far back in time as 1754. 
17 Briceland, Ephraim Kirby: Pioneer of American Law Reporting, 1789, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
302 (1972). 
18 Joyce, supra note 13, at 1297. 
19 Act of Feb. 24, 1806, § 25, Pa. Laws 345. 
20 Not until 1834 did the Supreme Court issue an order requiring that its justices file all subsequent 
opinions in writing, Order of Mar. 14, 1834, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) vii (1834). Prior to this order, many opinions 
were delivered orally. 
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What casts even more doubt on the accuracy of Dallas’ reporting are questions relating to 
the substance of his publications. True, the virtual absence of written opinions in the first ten years 
of the Court’s existence made compiling decisions rather demanding. But, to provide an example, 
rather than simply re-transcribing his sources,21 Dallas appears to have sometimes enhanced them; 
this became clear when an original source that he had purported to copy in one of the arguments 
of a 1796 case resurfaced and featured blatantly different content.22 His patchwork law reports 
should not be characterized as misinformation, but they certainly do not deserve to be called totally 
authentic. 
Now, despite the imperfections of the Court’s earliest opinions—which largely existed as 
a result of the problems in reporting—their publication in volumes is the first real act of 
transparency committed by the Judiciary. Though the primary purpose of publishing opinions was 
to catalogue precedent and establish a system of legal reference, the information itself was 
nonetheless available to the public for whatever uses they intended. However, as the young 
Supreme Court began to incur a larger docket, the need for uniform correctness arose. 
 The Court’s new mission to establish a more accurate record of their opinions was 
simultaneously its second movement in the direction of increased judicial transparency. Providing 
a truer representation of the Court’s work was—and still is—important, as it offered the public the 
proper tools with which to informedly participate in the government.23 But, whether Americans 
were aware, the material they had been receiving was not entirely the handiwork of Supreme Court 
justices. Fortunately, the institution’s issue with their problematic Reporter seemed as though it 
                                                 
21 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 207 (crediting the content of his report to his having been provided notes by 
W. Tilghman, counsel in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)). 
22 Joyce, supra note 13, at 1305. Dallas had apparently omitted whole paragraphs and occasionally 
shifted emphasis on what he had retained. 
23 Samaha, supra note 3. 
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would fix itself when Alexander Dallas abandoned his commitment to compiling the Court’s 
opinions in 1800. In fact, by the time the federal government had finally transitioned to 
Washington City, he had apparently developed a distaste for his long-time responsibility. In a letter 
to a friend, he expressed his frustration: 
I have found such miserable encouragement for my Reports, that I have determined to call 
them all in, and devote them to the rats in the State-House…. [L]et me beg of you to direct 
a servant to nail up, and forward, those that remain in your care. The manuscript of 4t. 
Volume is compleat [sic] – it brings the decisions of the Supreme Court of the US. down 
to the last Term; but I will commit it to the flames instead of the press.24 
 
The decisions referenced, from the August 1800 Term, now comprise a portion of volume 4 of 
Dallas’ Reports.25 With this final contribution, the Court’s original Reporter created the position’s 
first vacancy, albeit informally.26 
William Cranch began reporting for the Court following his predecessor’s leave. But how 
he managed to inherit the burden is not as well understood as his ascendancy to local prestige. 
Shortly after Cranch’s arrival to the capital city in 1800, his uncle, John Adams, appointed him 
Commissioner of Public Buildings in the Federal City, then, in supplement to the Act of Feb. 27, 
1801, an assistant judge on the new District of Columbia Circuit Court.27 Thereafter, the well-
connected jurist resumed Dallas’ work, and, despite his having multiple responsibilities, he seemed 
to take the job seriously. Writing in the preface to his first volume, he noted that, “uncertainty of 
the law, which is … the subject of complaint in this country, may be attributed to the want of 
American reports” and that, “[u]niformity … can not be expected … unless the decisions of the 
                                                 
24 Alexander J. Dallas to Jonathan Dayton (Oct. 18, 1802), George M. Dallas Papers, Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
25 Joyce, supra note 13, at 1306. 
26 At this point the Court is still without an official Reporter position. See note 22. 
27 Joyce, supra note 13, at 1307; see also Act of Feb. 27, 1801 (ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103) (creating the 
United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia). 
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various courts are made known to each other.”  He adds that for uniformity to persist in a national 
judiciary, “report[ing] the cases decided by the Supreme Court … can not need an apology.”28 
Cranch appeared to believe this undertaking required greater attention to detail as well as extra 
materials that his predecessor never provided. However, his efforts to improve upon the quality of 
the previous record, successful as they were, created a new problem.29 His sure “prolixity,” often 
containing what may as well be supplemental scholarship, was too expensive for reasonable public 
access.30 Thus, the Court now faced another transparency conflict. 
Whether the dissemination of opinions was on a wide enough scale to reach a sizeable 
readership determines the actual value of opinion publication as a medium of transparency. If 
purchasing (or otherwise borrowing) contemporary case law were feasible for only a fraction of 
the population, how can the volumes’ mere availability in the market have qualified as 
transparency? Access was curtailed, in a way that favored the few. Interestingly, the Legislature 
sought to remedy the cost barrier by passing the Act of February 22, 1827, which prohibited 
                                                 
28 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii-v (1804). 
29 Joyce, supra note 13, at 1308. As Joyce found, Cranch provided accurate summaries of the 
arguments of counsel, but, to provide an example of the Reporter’s superfluous additions, Joyce also noted 
that he included original “useful additional matter” in the first and fourth volumes of his Reports, which 
contributed to higher production costs. 
30 William Pinkney to Henry Wheaton (Sept. 3, 1818), Wheaton Papers, The Pierpont Morgan 
Library, New York City. Pinkney also described Cranch’s Reports as “unprofitable” and “expensive.” To 
illustrate the financial roadblock, consider that the price of a set of Cranch’s volumes drew close to fifty 
dollars. Joyce, supra note 13, at 1309. Moreover, Smith Thompson’s purchase of vols. VII, VIII, and IX of 
Cranch's Reports cost him $16.00 in 1818. W. Gould to Smith Thompson (Feb. 3, 1818), Gilbert Livingston 
Papers, New York Public Library, New York City. Taking into account inflation from 1818 to 2019, and 
considering the page lengths of vols. VII, VIII, and IX (656, 495, and 520, respectively) and of the three 
most recent volumes of United States Reports (vols. 567, 568, and 569) (1,313, 1,414, and 1,182, 
respectively), the approximate average cost per page of the Cranch volumes—at least for Thompson—
would have been $0.19 in 2019, whereas the approximate cost per page for the recent triplet (sold by the 
U.S. Government Publishing Office at, usually, $82.00) would have been $0.06 in 2019. See generally table 
in App. A. 
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volume price points in excess of five dollars per copy.31 However, the Court’s own approach to 
this issue of limited dissemination would mark its next major step forward, but, arguably, the 
development unfolded slowly in the wake of foundational American copyright precedent. 
Henry Wheaton, the Court’s third Reporter (and its first official one), compiled decisions 
from 1816 to 1827 and enjoyed the limited monopoly granted thereto by copyright. In pursuit of 
literary protection, Wheaton purportedly acquired a copyright for his first volume under the 
common law in Pennsylvania. Then in 1827, Richard Peters, Jr., his immediate successor, 
published and sold a comprehensive abridgment of the Court’s decisions to date.32 Wheaton, who 
previously reaped the spoils of uncontested rights, sued Peters, asserting infringement. He argued 
that Peters’ work contained, “without any material abbreviation or alteration, all the reports of 
cases in the said first volume” and requested an injunction be placed on further sales.33 In the trial 
court, Peters denied that he had infringed upon any protected material. Furthermore, he rejected 
the validity of Wheaton’s copyright on the basis of an alleged failure to satisfy the federal statutory 
requirements for procuring a copyright. The trial court ruled in favor of Peters and Wheaton 
appealed to the Supreme Court—his former employer. 
Writing for the majority, Justice McLean affirmed the lower court ruling. He noted that 
nowhere in the common law, insofar as its English form had been introduced to the state of 
Pennsylvania, could a guarantee of perpetual property in the copyright of one’s work be found. 
The Court thus rejected Wheaton’s claim that “no presumption could be drawn against the 
                                                 
31 Act of Feb. 22, 1827, ch. 18, §§ 1-3, 4 Stat. 205. 
32 RICHARD PETERS ET AL., CONDENSED REPORTS OF CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONTAINING THE WHOLE SERIES OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT FROM ITS 
ORGANIZATION TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PETER'S REPORTS AT JANUARY TERM 1827: WITH 
COPIOUS NOTES OF PARALLEL CASES IN THE SUPREME AND CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1830). 
33 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 595 (1834). 
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existence of the common law as to copyrights … from the fact of its never having been asserted 
until the commencement of [the] suit.”34 As for whether the issue had been addressed at the time 
of the state’s initial settlement, “it was [already] decided by the highest judicial court in England 
that the right of authors could not be asserted at common law, but under … statute.”35 Likewise, 
if even the whole of English common law had been adopted by Pennsylvania courts, Wheaton’s 
argument would have stood baseless. Justice McLean also rejected the complainant’s belief that 
the term “secure,” as it is used in the Constitution and in the acts of Congress, should be taken to 
“indicate[] an intention not to originate a right, but to protect one already in existence” (i.e., the 
first volume’s registration).36 He explained that Congress, through its passing of the act of 1790—
the Legislature’s solidification of its Sec. 8 powers—meant to originate a copyright, “instead of 
sanctioning an existing [one].”37 
The Court next addressed whether Wheaton had satisfied the applicable statutory 
requirements for procuring a valid copyright. The procedure imposed the following steps: 
First, the title of the book is to be deposited with the clerk, and the record he makes must 
be inserted in the first or second page; then the public notice in the newspapers is to be 
given, and within six months after the publication of the book a copy must be deposited in 
the Department of State.38 
 
                                                 
34 Id. at 659. 
35 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the 
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned, 9 Anne c. 19 (1710). This 
statute (“the Statute of Anne”) is commonly recognized as the English-speaking world’s first copyright law.  
36 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (delegating Congress’ authority to “promote the progress of science 
and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries”); see also Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 5, 1 Stat. (granting the “sole right and liberty 
of printing” to an author). 
37 Supra note 33, at 661. 
38 Id. at 664. 
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Wheaton argued that his alleged compliance with the first two requirements perfected his title. The 
Court disagreed and, in a manner of deference to the Legislature, caused for the necessity that all 
four parts of the statute be satisfied. 
Last, and most importantly for the sake of our transparency inquiry, the majority noted that 
the Court is “unanimously of [the] opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the 
written opinions delivered by [it], and that the judges … cannot confer on any reporter any such 
right.”39 Justification behind this is absent from the opinion, but the implications of the holding 
are clear. Prior to the decision, any Reporter could have secured a right to control the publication 
and dissemination of opinions, thus wielding the ability to restrict public access as a private entity. 
Without Wheaton, this would also apply to private entities with similar rights to items like statutes, 
official speeches, and other information from the public domain. 
The outcome of the case favored one of two competing interests. On the one hand, authors 
sought the right to profit from their labor, “both for the encouragement of their own work and for 
the advancement of a national literature.”40 On the other hand, a heavily pro-author perspective 
preferred the creation of monopolies, thereby defeating the public’s legitimate interest in 
affordable access to public materials.41 Wheaton prevented the latter. The holding defined the 
fundamental limits of copyright on the premise that to confer upon an author such a right is to 
grant said author a limited monopoly but primarily for the public’s benefit. The resulting blow 
against opportunities to profit from what should rightfully remain within the common citizen’s 
financial reach represented the Court’s longest stride toward transparency yet. No longer could 
                                                 
39 Id. at 668. 
40 Joyce, supra note 13, at 1372. 
41 Id. 
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private individuals with “real business acumen,” like Richard Peters, Jr., tap into unregulated 
markets and capitalize on business interests that place mass information in the periphery.42 
 The increased availability of opinions that resulted from the Wheaton holding continued to 
expand in later cases. In Banks v. Manchester, the Court extended the principle of open access to 
state court opinions, acknowledging the public’s “right of access” to them.43 The Court also held 
that parts of state reports could not receive copyright protection for lack of an author but that whole 
volumes should not be precluded from the same protection because “other portions of … [them] 
may satisfy the requirement of authorship.”44 In the same year, the Court narrowed Wheaton by 
holding in Callaghan v. Myers that original additives to opinions and statutes may be 
copyrighted.45 This indirectly incentivized the publication of explanatory material that made sense 
of otherwise complex content. Then, a century later, the Court held in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co. that a compilation of facts—which, individually, belong to the public 
domain—may qualify for protection.46 If the compilation exhibits some degree of originality in 
the arrangement of facts, it may enjoy legal treatment as a work of authorship. All of these 
subsequent developments have helped in answering the aged question, “Who owns the law?”47 
But though the simple, theoretical answer is that it belongs to the people, the issue of ownership is 
clearly more complicated. 
Disseminating a reliable judicial record proved difficult for the young Supreme Court, but 
the institution evidently succeeded, taking its largest steps in the former half of the eighteenth 
                                                 
42 Id. at 1389. 
43 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). 
44 Id. at 253. 
45 Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). 
46 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
47 Beth Ford, Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OREGON LAW REVIEW 541 (2014). 
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century. However, the later advent of instantaneous communication technology presented the 
Court with new challenges. Achieving increased transparency now required that it expand the 
convenience of the recently improved access. To do so meant that news of opinions would have to 
come with greater speed. Certainly, Washington news outlets utilized electronic innovation to 
communicate what would otherwise travel on paper, but as for the Court’s own attempt to spread 
information with such speed, the only time it did so contemporarily was during a demonstration 
of Morse’s telegraph in 1844.48 After this point, the Court would experience an extensive gap until 
it saw its next few major steps toward increased transparency. These steps would not occur until 
President Eisenhower’s appointment of Earl Warren to serve as the nation’s fourteenth Chief 
Justice. 
The Warren Court 
Not too long after Chief Justice Warren assumed office, the Court elected to begin 
recording oral argumentation audio in 1955.49 This unprecedented act of transparency was not as 
open as one might believe, however. Initially, only handpicked cases were to be recorded, 
“underscoring [the Court’s] reticence and [having] the unfortunate effect of reemphasizing that all 
of the rest of the cases were off limits.”50 Further, use of the audio was at first limited to justices 
and their clerks, “with some access granted to researchers.”51 From 1955 to the end of the century, 
the justices sporadically displayed their reluctance to disseminate the recordings. In 1971, for 
                                                 
48 Susan Freiwald & Stephen W. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 205 (2018). “On May 24, 1844, a crowd gathered inside the United States Supreme 
Court chambers in the basement of the Capitol, eagerly awaiting a demonstration of an amazing new 
communication technology. They watched as inventor Samuel F.B. Morse successfully sent the first long-
distance telegraph message—‘What hath God wrought?’—to a railroad station near Baltimore.” 
49 The Warren Court began in 1953 and lasted until 1969, when the Chief Justice announced his 
retirement. 
50 RonNell A. Jones, U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Press Access, BRIGHAM YOUNG 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1791, 1798 (2012). 
51 Recordings of the Court, OYEZ.ORG, http://oyez.org/about (last visited Apr 3, 2019). 
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example, when CBS broadcasted part of the oral arguments in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court 
stopped sending audio tapes to the National Archives for fifteen years.52 When they resumed the 
release of tapes in 1986, they required users to obtain Court permission, which would have been 
granted only for educational and non-commercial purposes.53 Interestingly, the Court waited until 
the early 1990s to grant the public full access to the materials.54 By this time, many of the 
institution’s most notable—and controversial—landmark cases had long been argued and decided. 
The Court would address this early policy of delayed release later on. 
The Warren Court’s other contribution to transparency came near the end of its sixteen-
year duration, when it began archiving and releasing all oral argument transcripts at the beginning 
of the 1968 Term.55 Before this, transcripts were hit or miss, so to speak. Also, the fact that the 
release of transcripts began over a decade after the recording of argument audio has ignited some 
interest. This is probably because it might make more sense to first release the transcripts, if one 
is to think about the chronology of technological innovation and the pattern of institutional 
adoption of such innovation—generally in accordance with that chronology. And on a more 
practical level, not to mention, ease of legal citation could have improved earlier if transcription 
came first. Regardless of the interpretation, the availability of audio recordings and transcripts, 
though for a while unsteady and inconsistent, at last introduced the Court to the technological age. 
Though in delayed fashion—as per usual—the Court solidified the basis for its later movement 
toward increased public access, thanks to Warren Era initiatives and their modernizing effect. 
                                                 
52 Roy M. Mersky & Kumar Percy, The Supreme Court Enters the Internet Age, 63 TEX. B.J. 569, 
569 (2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/supremect.htm. 
53 Id. 
54 Jones, supra note 50. 
55 Transcripts and Recordings of Oral Arguments, HOME - SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
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Current Policy 
 Now, the Court posts argument transcripts on its website on the same day the arguments 
take place.56 Only a decade prior to the creation of the website in 2000, “it had made decisions 
available electronically to [only] news and legal information organizations.”57 As for audio, the 
justices first agreed to release the tapes to the media for specific high-profile cases on the day of 
arguments. In response to C-SPAN’s requests, the Court allowed the same-day release of the audio 
for Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board and Bush v. Gore, only after denying various 
other networks’ requests for permission to televise the proceedings live.58 The Court has ultimately 
adopted a policy of releasing audio recordings at the end of the week.59 
 This is essentially where the Court currently stands with respect to its level of openness 
with the public. Since the initial release of opinions in 1791, the institution has taken multiple steps 
toward transparency, while sometimes regressing, as evidenced by its early struggles with 
accuracy and its recent unpredictability with the release of audio and transcript materials. 
Nevertheless, the remarkable progress the Court has made since its foundation proves how open it 
truly is. Considering that, as stated before, the near totality of the Court’s work is case-related, the 
fact that its progression over time has led to easier and more widespread access to materials and 
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information related directly to its work suggests that the Supreme Court is a highly transparent 
institution and, as the next section of this thesis will demonstrate, perhaps the most transparent 
body within the government. Whether the individual milestones were achieved in response to 
demands for transparency, the Court has nonetheless opened its doors, for want of a better phrase. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE OBLIGATION OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY 
 
Government Transparency in General 
James Madison wrote that, “popular government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or to a Tragedy.”60 He believed that a lack of 
knowledge about internal government action could possibly deny the public a means of preventing 
an unfavorable quality of life. In our present democracy—largely of Madison’s design—citizens 
are meant to “appreciably influence the direction of government, and … have an opportunity to 
assess progress and assign blame.”61 Thus, the government bears an obligation to make available 
certain materials and information to encourage informed participation in a system over which the 
people are sovereign. The legitimate interests of private individuals motivate the demand for an 
expansion of transparency as further disclosure is a “necessary precondition” to accountability.62 
Essentially, transparency is a way to ensure that “persons with public responsibilities [are] 
answerable to ‘the people’ for the performance of their duties.”63 
Generally, expanding of transparency is a good thing. With more access to information, 
the populace can become better-equipped to identify potential points of concern, deter corruption, 
and incentivize the continuance of decent policies with the promise of political support. On the 
                                                 
60 Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
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61 Samaha, supra note 3. 
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contrary, opacity may deprive the people of such privileges. So, to avoid Madison’s tragedy, all 
branches of the government should fulfill the obligation of transparency. But how and to what 
extent they do ought to vary depending on the nature of their relationships with the public. 
The Elected Branches 
 In the elected (political) branches, where it is incumbent upon officials to act on behalf of 
their constituents, the obligation of transparency is inherently immediate. This sense of immediacy 
derives from the idea that voters hold those whom they elect accountable for their decisions. Public 
accountability, Shkabatur notes, consists of two components: “the explanation and justification of 
… activities to the public; and an accompanying mechanism for public sanctions.”64 The former 
entails an explanatory standard; the latter may, though not necessarily, require a punitive element 
(e.g., impeachment/expulsion, removal from special committees, loss of voter trust, or failure to 
win re-election).65 These components comprise a system—a surveillance apparatus of sorts—
aimed at rewarding abstinence from selfishness and are, in effect, the people’s check against 
vicious inclinations. 
 Public accountability is primarily satisfied with transparency. “[T]he free flow of 
information to interested members of the public is a prerequisite to their participation in the 
deliberative process and to their ability to hold elected officials accountable.”66 For the Legislature, 
popular deliberation provokes a regional—and sometimes national—discourse that, in practice, 
reflects the direction of voter support in midterm elections. Since legislators usually seek to 
maintain their incumbency—a goal that is becoming increasingly commonplace—their 
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responsiveness to constituents must be attentive and satisfactory in order to achieve a discourse 
that signifies favorability.67 Ideally, this relationship is intimate when compared to the more 
generalized (and often divided) one shared between eligible voters and the president. For the 
Executive Branch, popular deliberation provokes a national discourse that reflects the direction of 
voter support in presidential elections and also the state of party cohesiveness. It goes without 
saying that the people’s relationship with Congress is more direct, whereas it is less so the case 
with the president. Likewise, the immediacy of transparency as an official obligation would seem 
greater where the relationship is more direct. 
But should the executive’s relative disconnect with the people translate to a lower standard 
of openness? Certainly not. The standard can be, and arguably is, much higher. For example, the 
consequences of an uninformed population in a national election could be undesirable for all of 
America. To elect a candidate who is unfit for the position would be to potentially endanger the 
country’s national security, seeing as the president is chief diplomat and supreme military 
commander.68 Moreover, the frequency with which the media discusses the president suggests a 
significant popular interest in the officeholder’s actions. According to one content analysis, 
network television covers the presidency “twice as much as Congress and nearly five times as 
much as the U.S. Supreme Court.”69 Another analysis looked at the nature of recent coverage on 
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Recently, however, the Republican party saw more members of the House declare no intention to run for 
re-election in the 2018 midterms. The Democrats also saw more members of the same chamber declare no 
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the Trump Administration in comparison to past administrations, finding that 69% of coverage on 
the current administration framed segments around leadership and character, while the other 31% 
focused on ideology and agenda. Average coverage throughout the Obama Administration framed 
related stories evenly (50% on leadership and character; 50% on ideology and agenda), and 
coverage during the Bush and Clinton administrations tended to focus more on ideology and 
agenda.70 Such reports suggest an increasingly personal interest in the president, whether for 
critical or supportive reasons. Either way, not only does the public possess a reasonable right to 
demand a transparent executive, it expresses its interest in one. 
Last, there is the question of what freedom the political branches ought to enjoy in their 
day-to-day operation. That inquiry seeks to identify circumstances under which confidentiality is 
either necessary or appropriate, and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) has effectively 
drawn a line to differentiate information that the public may request access to from that which is 
exempt.71 Though the FOIA has disappointed many since its enactment in 1966, largely due to its 
having placed the burden on requestors, and for lack of affirmative disclosure duties, many of its 
codified exemptions are still sensible. For example, the FOIA does not apply to matters 
“established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign 
policy.”72 Also, it is extensively vigilant to preserve fair law enforcement proceedings.73 Its other 
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exemptions include materials related to things like geological information about wells, personal 
privacy, and litigation privileges—all of which are tied either directly or indirectly to the work or 
delegation of the government. Needless to say, there are certain things recognized by law that the 
political branches must withhold in order to function in accordance with the people’s greater 
interests.74 
Transparency in the Supreme Court 
In the Judiciary, the nature of necessary freedom applies almost entirely to case-related 
matters. Aside from other sensitivities, like insider trading concerns, the focus of independence in 
the federal government’s only unelected (apolitical) branch—more specifically, the Supreme 
Court—relates to the extent that its political insulation (or, sometimes, lack thereof) allows it to 
adjudicate matters without regard to persons.75 Yet, despite the omnipresent possibility of political 
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encroachment upon the Court, as well as the high degree of sensitivity associated with pending 
cases, the Supreme Court does in fact bear an obligation to be transparent with the public. Though 
the relationship between the Court and the people is nothing at all like that in the elected branches, 
there are still a number of reasons to emphasize openness within the institution. 
Adam Samaha notes six ways in which information regarding the courts and their work 
can be valued, and these foci seem to accommodate the Supreme Court, notwithstanding its special 
differences from other judicial institutions. First, information is valued for monitoring purposes, 
since transparency demands commonly contend that, “bad conduct is more likely to take place 
when the relevant actors are able to shield themselves from others.” Thus, “[i]nformation access 
might facilitate monitoring … and deter misconduct or otherwise result in desired behavioral 
change.” Second, access to information allows for reform. On this point, Samaha notes that, 
“[e]xposing information about judicial operations is the groundwork for intelligent judgment about 
the proper design of the court system.” Third, increased access to information helps potential 
litigants plan for future appearances before the Court. Fourth, information may benefit the public 
for settlement or legitimacy reasons since “[t]he concept of legitimacy includes moral judgments 
about when the influence of law is justified….” Fifth, information provides academic knowledge 
to all those who receive it—professional scholars, lawyers, students, and others. Samaha’s sixth 
point (popular entertainment), however, does not apply to the Court, seeing as there has never been 
an opportunity for consumption with respect to its proceedings.76 
A general familiarity with the concept of judicial independence helps to make sense of the 
Court’s distinctive obligation of transparency. Federalist No. 78—known for its defense of the 
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concept—provides an appropriate introduction to the context through which we should observe 
this. In the essay, Alexander Hamilton describes judicial independence to be “peculiarly essential 
in a limited Constitution.” The “benefits of the … moderation of the judiciary” should involve 
instances where it might “[displease] those whose sinister expectations … may have [been] 
disappointed” and where it must have “commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous 
and disinterested,” demonstrating the value of isolation in producing objectivity.77 Hamilton also 
alludes to the value of institutional independence in Federalist No. 76, in which he discusses the 
president’s nomination powers. He advises that the executive have “[fewer] personal attachments 
to gratify” in the selection of judicial nominees. The selection should also be restrained by “a more 
exact regard to reputation” and an obligation to “prefer with impartiality the persons who may 
have the fairest pretensions to [the requisite qualities]” of the position to be filled.78 
Setting the proper context also benefits from understanding the Court’s exclusive power of 
judicial review. Hamilton comments on this idea as well. In his career as an attorney, he breaks 
ground on the concept of judicial review, arguing for the defense in Rutgers v. Waddington 
(1784).79 His position serves as a precursor to the same idea he advocates later on in the Federalist, 
where he writes that, “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
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courts.” He adds that a constitution “belongs to [judges] to ascertain its meaning.”80 Then, in 
solidifying this view, Chief Justice John Marshall writes in 1803 that, “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”81 But the fact that this 
exclusive authority was not established until Marbury is interesting. Hamilton would likely have 
believed that virtual political insulation is optimal for judicial review since the various privileges 
and immunities afforded to judges free them “from the need to behave in politically advantageous 
ways.”82 In other words, serving a life term (during good behavior) precludes the necessity to 
please for political reasons and erases—or at least it should—the fear of retribution as a result of 
rendering unpopular decisions. So, why were judicial review and independence not established 
simultaneously? The answer is unclear, but we do know a few things: (1) that the Constitution is 
somewhat vague in its definition of judicial powers and (2) that its substance represents a 
compromise between advocates of strong and weak central government. 
Article I of the Constitution of 1787 creates the United States Congress, “which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”83 Section 2 details the manner in which officials 
are elected, the length of the terms for which said officials may serve, the minimum frequency of 
assemblies, and other structural components of the Legislature. Article I also delegates specific 
powers to Congress—a detail-oriented effort at a job description, so to speak.84 Among these 
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include the right to impose and collect taxes and to coin a national currency. Article II defines the 
powers of the president, vesting thereto, among other things, the power to make treaties and to 
make official appointments. Article III, however, is concise. Section 1 establishes the Supreme 
Court and (expanding on Article I) gives Congress the authority to vest the remaining judicial 
power to “such inferior Courts as [it] may from time to time ordain and establish.”85 Section 2 
describes the original and appellate jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and mandates that the “Trial 
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury … in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed.”86 Finally, Section 3 addresses the prosecution of treason. 
Unlike the Constitution’s treatment of the elected branches, its creation of the Judiciary is, 
effectively, no more than a mere creation. Nowhere in Article III can we find a contemplation of 
judicial review. Perhaps this is due in part to a lack of precedent. At the time, the British judiciary 
was comprised of three court systems: King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Chancery. Each 
adjudicated a particular subject matter: criminal law, private law, and matters of equity, 
respectively. Moreover, the Framers had no intention of reproducing the British style of 
government, so starting from a blank slate made the Convention’s objective all the more difficult. 
Needless to say, the end result was vague, and it warranted further clarification. 
We also know that the Constitution is a product of the compromise made between the 
Federalists and the Antifederalists, and this is especially true with respect to Article III. The 
former’s arguments are expressed in the Federalist Papers, whereas their opponents’ views 
constitute a collection of writings referred to as—conveniently—the Antifederalist Papers. 
Regarding the Judiciary, Antifederalist No. 78-79 notes that, “[t]he supreme court under [the] 
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constitution would be exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to no control.” 
Specifically, the essay points out that the Court’s power would be “in many cases superior to that 
of the legislature.”87 But, two months prior to the essay’s publication, Oliver Ellsworth (who would 
later become the third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), before the Connecticut ratification 
convention, asserted that the Constitution defines the Judiciary as a check against the general 
legislature. This check, he argued, is justified by its delegation of review powers to national judges, 
“who to secure their impartiality are to be made independent,” over matters in which the United 
States makes laws that may contradict the Constitution, or when states make laws that usurp the 
general government.88 Ellsworth calls judicial review a necessary “coercion of law” that promotes 
national integrity. Still, the scope of judicial authority is unclear at this point, and it is effectively 
unaddressed in Article III. It is not until Marbury that the judicial powers are sufficiently defined. 
Clearly, the Supreme Court wields a consequential authority to uphold or nullify another 
branch’s actions. Thus, it should come as no surprise that many have subjected this exclusive 
power to controversy. Some claim that judicial review arms the Court as a super legislator, while 
others warn that abolishing it would gift the president a “virtual blank check” and force courts to 
sustain congressional violations of the separation of powers, justified “in the name of ‘the 
people.’”89 By its strongest proponents, the Marbury legacy is revered with hallowed status. 
Regardless of any opinion, judicial review is practically an integral component of the judicial 
process today, and its implications are profound. Therefore, as this thesis progresses, all further 
consideration of the Supreme Court should not abandon the import of its exclusive authority to 
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“say what the law is.”90 Further, we should view its unique independence relative to judicial 
review—specifically, how different degrees of independence encourage (or impede) unbiased 
review execution. 
 To demonstrate the dependency of impartial judicial review on independence, I will briefly 
experiment with the latter’s polar extremes in the abstract. So, when the idea of maximum 
transparency is discussed, I endeavor to mean a Supreme Court that must respond to all demands 
for increased disclosure. With maximum transparency, the Court receives hardly any room to 
operate satisfactorily. Requiring it to disclose all materials or respond to all requests for 
information—much like how the FOIA works—would bring previously discussed concerns to the 
forefront (e.g., insider trading, breach of confidentiality). More importantly though, responding to 
such request makes the institution answerable to the people, essentially demonstrating the Court’s 
interest in giving the people what they want, for lack of a better description. By the same token, 
minimum transparency entails complete institutional freedom from such compulsion. Not having 
to make available its materials and information, either in relation to pending cases or those recently 
decided, would probably provide for the most comfortable setting for judges to decide cases in 
isolation from the public. However, this would prompt outsiders to attach undesirable descriptors 
of secrecy to the institution.91 And, let us not forget, judges were never granted complete immunity 
from removal. Vesting to the Supreme Court a right to total isolation would deprive Congress of 
the ability to monitor any bad behavior and act accordingly.92 
                                                 
90Dowdle, supra note 63. 
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Now, surely neither of these extremes represent the Roberts Court, nor any past court for 
that matter, but the point of thinking about them is to establish a spectrum on which to place the 
prospect of implementing cameras in Supreme Court proceedings. If the Court were to allow such 
devices in the courtroom, what changes in the judicial process might we suspect? Are these 
changes good, or are they bad? It ultimately comes to whether we value transparency more so than 
we do the assurance of optimal institutional function, and televising the Supreme Court in action 
would undeniably be a radical form of transparency. But doing so may yield positive outcomes. 
Likewise, there may also be a plethora of negatives to be weighed in consideration of TV coverage.
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CHAPTER III 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 This section will first cover two potential benefits, then two concerns, followed by a third, 
relatively insignificant issue. After each is elaborated, all will be considered together to formulate 
a suggestion regarding the direction of the debate about bringing cameras into the Supreme Court. 
Foreseeable Consequences 
If H.R. 464—or something similar to it—were to pass, the Supreme Court must “permit 
television coverage of all open sessions of the Court unless [it] decides, by a vote of the majority 
of justices, that allowing such coverage in a particular case would constitute a violation of the due 
process rights of one or more of the parties before the Court.”93 Such an unprecedented change 
would be the most significant movement toward increased transparency in the Court’s history, and 
it would also entail both beneficial and harmful implications. This last section seeks to explore 
some of these concerns and how they might contribute to arguments either for or against cameras 
in the Court. It must be established, however, that the following discussion is predominantly 
speculative. After all, no video camera has found its way into the nation’s highest court while in 
session, so there is no past material from which to draw in the contemporary debate.94 Moreover, 
the fact that some other—lower—courts allow cameras during their proceedings does not mean a 
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whole lot for our discussion. To be rather blunt, the Supreme Court is just too different and, dare 
I say, too special for the experiences of other venues to serve as comparable evidence. 
Permitting video cameras in the Supreme Court—and thus, televised coverage of official 
proceedings—would provide the public with an extensive wealth of knowledge and means of 
education. In 1921, Charles Warren wrote that, “[t]he reaction of the people to judicially declared 
law has been an especially important factor in the development of the country; for while the 
Judges’ decision makes the law, it is often the people’s view of the decision which makes 
history.”95 But in a society where many believe the Supreme Court building houses a jury room 
and where high school students are taught only to memorize iceberg-tip legacies of no more than 
three Marshall Era decisions, “the true extent to which the American citizenry is uninformed seems 
quite alarming.”96 Many attribute misunderstandings to Hollywood portrayals of the legal 
profession, while the limited sense of import tagged to the Judiciary in schools cannot be so easily 
explained.97 
Justice Harlan seemed to recognize a public benefit for modern education as a weapon 
against rampant ignorance, noting that, “television is capable of performing an educational 
function by acquainting the public with the judicial process in action.”98 Justice Frankfurter, who 
believed that, “public confidence in the judiciary hinges on the public’s perception of it,” even 
wished the news media would cover the Court as much as it did the World Series.99 Whether the 
justices were truly thinking ahead of their time, their words encapsulate the idea that “reality … is 
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more educational than interpretation”—something the public would otherwise be left to do from 
textual objects of the Court’s work.100 Justices Harlan and Frankfurter would have been more 
likely to acknowledge that allowing cameras “would not only educate the lay public about the law 
and the legal profession, but it also would provide a looking-glass through which the legal 
community could study and improve its skills in oral advocacy.”101 
Cameras would satisfy transparency demands. In 2006, the Congressional Research 
Service referenced a survey from that same year, which found that 70% of those polled believed 
televising the Supreme Court’s oral arguments was a good idea. The report cited “increasing 
support for more transparency in government, the Court’s recent issuance of controversial 
decisions, and the public’s expectation that future Supreme Court cases were likely to involve 
constitutional issues of great public interest” as reasons for the high rate of support.102 Another 
survey reported a 71% support rate in favor of cameras among poll respondents and cited similar 
motives underlying public sentiments on the issue.103 More recently, C-SPAN commissioned PSB 
(a research-based consultant company) to conduct a survey on the topic, following the Kavanaugh 
confirmation hearings. The poll found that 64% of respondents supported cameras, but, 
interestingly, the same poll found that 91% of respondents believed Supreme Court decisions 
affected their everyday lives as citizens.104 These reports, and others like them, are no anomaly, 
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and understandably so, as the court of public opinion has tended toward the principle of open 
access in government. 
Though there certainly are desirable consequences associated with cameras in the Court, 
there are a few that must be avoided. The most concerning of these is the potential incubation of 
political encroachment upon the institution. According to the PSB survey, 56% of respondents 
stated their belief that the Court is currently divided politically, which indicates that “[p]eople are 
… assuming [the justices are] partisan entities.” “That,” a PSB senior strategist notes, “has very 
serious implications.”105 Televising proceedings would provide the public a window view of the 
Court’s operation, but it is probable that this view will at some point in translation be distorted (or 
spun). In terms of newsworthiness, “[w]e expect that if the Court decides a case in a ‘liberal’ or 
‘conservative’ manner this may affect whether a decision attracts media attention.”106 The same 
goes for pending cases for which the outcome of the case may be reasonably predicted, per the 
public’s understanding of who the “liberal” and “conservative” justices are in a given term. The 
key concern here is the public misconception of justices as politicians. 
Justices Elena Kagan and Samuel Alito recently testified before the House Appropriations 
Committee’s Financial Services and General Government Subcommittee and spoke to the idea of 
cameras in the Court when chairman Rep. Mike Quigley (D-Ill.) shifted the hearing’s focus. He 
remarked that, “Most Americans have no idea how Supreme Court proceedings even work.” 
Justice Kagan conceded that it would be “no small benefit if the American public were able to see 
[the proceedings]” but added that allowing cameras might cause justices to “filter” themselves “if 
they worried that playing devil’s advocate during arguments might be interpreted in a video clip 
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as being biased.” She concluded that if being able to watch the Court in action “came at the expense 
of the way the institution functioned, that would be a very bad bargain.”107 
Tony Mauro, who has made his position rather clear on the issue, claims that, “[w]hile 
cameras might, and probably do, distort the behavior of elected officials bent on pleasing their 
constituents, they should have little negative effect on contemplative, life-tenured judges who 
insist they are apolitical.”108 This is mostly true, especially considering that life tenure affords 
judges the divestment of any worry about displeasing a constituency. However, Mauro fails to 
address to issue of media spinning, which Justice Kagan essentially described in her testimony as 
predatory toward devil’s advocacy. Mauro instead briefly covers the problems of excessive media 
sensationalism, recalling the “intrusive coverage” of the 1935 trial of Bruno Hauptmann for having 
kidnapped Charles Lindbergh’s child.109 The coverage prompted the American Bar Association’s 
adoption of Canon 35, which suggested the banning of cameras and microphones from courtrooms 
for their ability to “degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto.”110 Mauro 
should have considered the possible degradation of the Court and creation of misconceptions about 
it that oftentimes result from the skewed ways in which off-center media outlets portray the 
institution or its justices. This issue is arguably enhanced when the subject matter of news material 
involves hot-button legal subjects like free speech, abortion, LGBTQ rights, campaign finance 
restrictions, and others that commonly result in 5-4 or 6-3 splits. 
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The second main concern with cameras in the Court is closely related to the first. It is 
reasonable to expect that, if increased media attention to the Court—by way of televised 
proceedings—may lead to further political encroachment, the ability of the institution to do its job 
impartially might be somewhat compromised. After all, damaged judicial independence is 
something the country probably cannot afford to incur, whether it knows this or not. Slight 
tendencies to cogitate one’s “sinister expectations,” as expressed through an evolving relationship 
between the Court and the political media, could spell for a defected vote or two in the next 
controversial civil rights case.111 This concern, though seldom discussed in the relevant debate, 
still requires a further exploration, and the connection between political encroachment and the 
predation of fair, informed adjudication could be a research endeavor on its own. 
A third concern about cameras is that the increase in access the public would receive would 
effectively introduce them to information known usually by lawyers—a supposed barrier to lay 
comprehension and actual popular education. As the late Justice Antonin Scalia explained in a 
2012 interview with C-SPAN, if the public were to tune in to oral arguments on their televisions, 
they would witness the bench engaging with counsel on “dull” topics like “the internal revenue 
code, … ERISA, … patent law,” and other things that “only a lawyer could understand and perhaps 
get interested in.” As mentioned before, however, this third concern is relatively unimportant; the 
fact that the Court’s work is not comprehensible to the lay observer does not—I believe—present 
any risk to the institution’s capacity to function properly. But, going back to previously discussed 
concerns, Scalia mentioned that, “what most of the American people would see would be 30-
                                                 
111 Supra note 77. 
41 
second, 15-second takeouts from … arguments,” taken out of context and wholly 
misrepresented.112 
Taken into consideration, these consequences do not balance. In Chapter II I mentioned 
that the debate fundamentally asks whether we value transparency more so than we do the 
assurance of optimal institutional function. Addressing what could happen if cameras were 
permitted in the courtroom reveals the possibility that the Supreme Court’s capacity to perform 
judicial review may be hindered. The lengths to which politics and the judicial process could come 
into contact merit hesitance when thinking about moving forward with such a radical new 
transparency policy. Nonetheless, the Court still bears an obligation to be open with the public 
about its work, albeit a relatively lesser one. The value of education for the public is immense, 
even if the substance of proceedings is “lawyerly.” But whether the public will benefit from 
cameras depends on if it can overcome the greatest problem it faces: itself. 
A Note on Temporal Propriety 
Society is not ready for televised coverage of the Supreme Court. The most alarming 
concerns of what could unfold relate to misconceptions about the Court—that it is merely another 
political institution. Of course, I do not assume that because many have this impression, all of 
society must as well. However, as political polarization researcher, Thad Kousser notes, “We are 
[at this time] a nation divided along ideological and partisan lines … with ‘liberal Republicans’ 
and ‘conservative Democrats’ becoming endangered species.” He adds that, “Policy is now 
contested mostly at the ends of the ideological spectrum.”113 Assuming Kousser’s position is 
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reflective of the country at large—and, as a spectator, I believe it is—then the general public is in 
a potentially dangerous position with respect to the Judiciary. Given the media’s role in reporting 
government activity in blatantly biased ways, one should not expect to watch clips of Court 
proceedings in the same contextual sequence across different news networks. Moreover, one 
cannot always anticipate even-handed reporting on such proceedings across networks like MSNBC 
and Fox News. 
Disseminating misinformation about the Supreme Court’s work to a vulnerable public may 
legitimize the idea of political judges if their work and words are spun to accommodate 
partisanship. In order for the people to demonstrate preparedness to accept the good that televised 
Court coverage has to offer, we must—aside from simply becoming less polarized—learn to 
appreciate the Judiciary in light of its independence and intention to administer equal justice under 
law. We must also understand its fundamental role in the separation of powers. If we do, we realize 
the necessity of impartial judges in a system of checks and balances. Finally, we must learn to 
tolerate political gridlock and not look to the courts to satisfy party preferences. If we can achieve 
this appreciative view, we can begin to discuss the implementation of video cameras at 1 First 
Street NE. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Indeed, the prospect of permitting cameras in the Supreme Court reveals a number of 
potential concerns. Yet, the value of their implementation would likely offer certain benefits that 
should merit our consideration. The foremost benefit would be an unprecedented stride in the 
direction of institutional transparency, but a look at history tells us, however, that the Court has 
already become arguably the most transparent body in United States government. From its 
beginning, the Court has both consciously and indirectly improved the quality of its record while 
making it more available to the public. If this is the case, would the adoption of a pro-camera 
policy even be necessary? After all, the principal motives underlying the movement still cite 
judicial transparency, which, as we know, is important for a number of reasons (including public 
accountability). What is certain is that the Court bears a unique obligation to be open with the 
public, but the degree of that openness is special to the extent that the relationship shared with the 
people is relatively disconnected, unlike in the political branches, where it is more intimate. 
Nonetheless, that relationship is extensive since the Court ensures the reasonable accessibility of 
its case-related information in a prompt and safe manner. 
As asserted in the final chapter (pp. 41-42), the appropriateness of implementing cameras 
depends on society’s willingness to appreciate the judicial process—specifically, the idea of 
judicial independence and its being a necessary precondition to the proper execution of judicial 
review. This societal evolution has yet to take place, given the previously cited concerns related to 
the country’s current political polarization. 
Further research on political polarization and public perception of Court-related news may 
advance this inquiry. The topic may also benefit from a more in-depth look at how the public views 
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the relationship between judicial independence and the obligation of transparency both across the 
government and within the Supreme Court. 
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APPENDIX A 
WILLIAM CRANCH’S PUBLICATION COSTS, CONSIDERING 
INFLATION 
 
 The table below compares the approximate cost per page of volumes VII, VIII, and IX of 
Cranch’s Reports against that of the three most recent volumes of United States Reports. The 
calculated results are adjusted to accommodate inflation from 1818 to 2019, as provided by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index (“CPI”). Accordingly, prices in 2019 are 
1,881.98% higher than average prices in 1818. This period averaged a 1.50% inflation rate.  
 Term(s) # of op’ns Pg. Cnt. Orig. cpu 
(USD) 
2019 cpu 
(∆ USD) 
Cost/pg. 
(∆ USD) 
Cost/op’n 
(∆ USD) 
   Cranch Volumes114    
Vol. VII Feb. 
1812/’13 
82 656 $5.33115 $105.71 $0.16 $1.29 
Vol. VIII Feb. 
1814 
44 495 $5.33 $105.71 $0.21 $2.40 
Vol. IX Feb. 
1815 
40 520 $5.33 $105.71 $0.20 $2.64 
Avg. Cost/pg. (2019 USD) $0.19  
    GPO United States Reports 
Vol. 567 Oct. 
2012 
18 1,313 $82.00116 $82.00 $0.06 $4.56 
Vol. 568 Oct. 
2012 
29 1,414 $82.00 $82.00 $0.06 $2.83 
Vol. 569 Oct. 
2011 
30 1,182 $82.00 $82.00 $0.07 $2.73 
Avg. Cost/pg. (2019 USD) $0.06  
                                                 
114 The volumes refer to those purchased by Justice Smith Thompson. See note 44. 
115 This value, listed once for each of the Cranch volumes, is a one-third quotient of the $16.00 
transaction in 1818. Id. 
116 U.S. Government Publishing Office, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (SCOTUS) U.S. 
GOVERNMENT BOOKSTORE, https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/supreme-court-united-states-scotus? 
field_format_value=Hardcover&sort_bef_combine=created%2BDESC&items_per_page=24 (last visited 
Mar 5, 2019). 
54 
Conclusion 
 The table above reports the average cost per page, adjusted to accommodate the change in 
purchasing power over time. Considering the price that Justice Smith Thompson paid for the three 
Cranch volumes ($16.00 in 1818—$317.12 today) and the average page count of those volumes, 
in comparison to the same averages associated with the three most recently published volumes of 
U.S. Reports, the average costs per page reflect a more expensive product in the earlier works. 
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APPENDIX B 
OUTGOING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, 2012-2018 
 
 The table below displays data from Ballotpedia and reflects only part of the original, which 
also considers members of Congress who left office before the midterms.117 The purpose of this 
table is to demonstrate the recent historical trend of seeking re-election in Congress. As noted in 
the second section of this thesis, the data for 2018 constitute an outlier in the trend that may be 
explained by a few political phenomena.118 
 
Year Chamber Democrats not 
seeking re-
election 
Republicans 
not seeking re-
election 
Total not 
seeking re-
election 
 
2018 
Senate 0 3 3 
House 18 34 52 
Total 18 37 55 
 
2016 
Senate 3 2 5 
House 8 20 28 
Total 11 22 33 
 
2014 
Senate 5 2 7 
House 16 25 41 
Total 21 27 48 
 
2012 
Senate 6 3 10 (+1 ind.) 
House 23 20 43 
Total 29 23 53 
 
                                                 
117 United States Senate elections, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA (2018), 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Senate_elections,_2020 (last visited Apr 15, 2019). 
118 Supra note 67. 
